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CAN COMPARATIVE RISK BE USED TO
DEVELOP BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS?
KEN JONES*
I.  INTRODUCTION
For at least the past ten years, a great deal of paper and time
have been sacrificed to promote the idea of using more risk in devel-
oping environmental decisions.1  In addition, thousands of people
have actually attempted to apply these ideas through the use of risk
assessment information in comparative risk projects.  It is now time
to determine whether the discussions promoting the use of more risk
are consistent with the findings of those that have tried to use risk.
As such, I hope to clarify in this paper the use of comparative risk as
a tool for environmental management.  This article is based on a set
of experiences gained in EPA-sponsored state and local comparative
risk projects.
II.  WHY COMPARE RISKS?
The ultimate question that we must address regarding compara-
tive risk is the following: Can comparative risk be used to develop
better environmental decisions?  This question contains terms that
still need to be defined.  Therefore, in an attempt to focus upon these
issues, I would like to identify some specific “decisions” within the
realm of the “environment” which will prove to be helpful in explor-
ing the role of “comparative risk.”
1.  The decision to impose a certain regulatory limit on the level of
atrazine in drinking water.  A comparison of the atrazine risk with
other environmental risks provides a perspective with which to make
regulatory decisions. From this perspective, for example, we perceive
that the resolution of such a regulatory issue requires an answer to
two questions: (1) what is the nature of the risk, in terms of the prob-
ability of a negative health outcome, that results from exposure to a
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1. OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987); RE-
SOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, WORST THINGS FIRST: THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994).
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certain level of the contaminant; and (2) how much will it cost to re-
duce the contaminant to a lower level.  Risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis, the merits of which have recently been debated in
Congress, respectively comprise our current analytical devices to
grapple with these questions.2
2.  The decision to clean up a Superfund site.  Superfund sites
raise a wide array of issues regarding the measurement of risk.  In
addition to such concerns as harm or potential harm to ecosystems
and property values, the related matter of liability broadens the pa-
rameters for determining remediation.
3.  The decision to focus budgetary resources upon a high risk
area.  Habitat loss or chemical contamination as a target?  Air or wa-
ter as a medium? A problem generally held to be within the govern-
ment’s responsibility or a problem many consider to be a personal
lifestyle choice?  Clearly the process of prioritizing risks expands the
range of issues to be confronted.
4.  The decision to disseminate the results of risk assessment com-
parisons to the public.  It is important to recognize that many people
consider the exercise of comparing risks to be an opportunity to in-
form the public so that political pressures can be focused on “the
right risks.”
5. The decision to inform leaders and stakeholders of the magni-
tude of the problems and the range of the solutions that might be im-
plemented.  Such an arrangement removes specific decisions as an
endpoint to the process, which decreases the potential for polarized
argument but also raises the possibility of disintegrating the focus of
the analysis.
While the above-listed decisions are possible arenas for com-
parative risk, our experience suggests that only a subset of these deci-
sions have so far been entertained within comparative risk projects.
In the first example, the specific risks of atrazine in drinking water
can be characterized and compared with other risks, such as the risks
from cigarette smoking or driving without a seatbelt, but the actual
decision of regulating the contaminant is not linked to these other is-
sues. The regulations come from both statutory language and the
precedent of the last three decades of implementation of the Safe
Drinking Water Act.3  This Act does not allow for a comparing of
2. S. 110, 103d Cong (1993); H.R. 4306, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 3425, 103d Cong.
(1993); H.R. 3111, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2910, 103d Cong., (1993).
3. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f - 300j-26 (1994).
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risks, but rather requires that standards be set to protect human
health without clarifying the degree of protection.  Superfund site
clean-up is also directed to some extent by the statutes which provide
for federal authority but which also allow for the consideration of lo-
cal conditions, costs of clean-up, and the laws of local jurisdictions.
However, the clean-up of a site is dependant upon the liability of re-
sponsible parties so that the comparison of risks between a particular
site and an environmental hazard unassociated with the liable parties
is outside the guidelines and intent of the law.  While these legal cir-
cumstances do not necessarily preclude the use of comparative risk,
experience to date gives no examples from which to inform this dis-
cussion.
Unlike the atrazine and Superfund matters, the latter three deci-
sions fall within the realistic potential for comparative risk projects as
they are being carried out currently at the state and local level.
However, while these examples provide a flavor for the wide range of
decisions or activities to which comparative risk can be developed, no
single project can accomplish multiple primary objectives. Therefore,
it is essential that project goals are carefully chosen and clearly ar-
ticulated by comparative risk projects’ participants and sponsors.
The remainder of the article will link process questions and proj-
ect results back to the specific objectives that particular projects are
directed towards.
III.  COMPARATIVE RISK FOR PRIORITY SETTING
The primary objective most often linked to comparative risk
projects is the ability to set priorities. Comparative risk discussions in
Congress, in the upper levels of environmental agencies, and in the
private sector are often based on the premise that resource allocation
should be prioritized according to the aggregate level of risk.4 Many
people feel that this type of prioritization will influence agency deci-
sion-makers to allocate their budgetary and staff resources in the
most efficient manner. It is this objective that draws so many partici-
pants into the process.
In developing the process for using comparative risk to set pri-
orities, two significant challenges arise: (1) developing a comprehen-
sive set of criteria for prioritization; and (2) overcoming the momen-
tum established by pre-existing priority-setting activities. Most
4. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR
SETTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996).
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comparative risk projects recognize the need to expand the analysis
beyond the considerations of risk.  The standard refrain is that prior-
ity-setting requires more than just the comparison of risks.  For ex-
ample, the Summary Report of the California Comparative Risk
Project includes a statement from the Statewide Community Advi-
sory Committee which emphasizes that “Risk-based rankings of envi-
ronmental topic areas are valuable and should be used for priority-
setting in conjunction with other factors.  Factors in addition to risk
that need to be incorporated into decision-making include, but are
not limited to, economics, public input, potential for pollution pre-
vention, need to address the existence of disparate impacts on differ-
ent populations, and  emergence of future risks.”5  The letter from
Natural Resources Secretary Jan Eastman introducing Vermont’s
comparative risk report carries a similar message: “As the Advisory
Committee recommends, risk reduction should be one of several cri-
teria used for setting policy.”6  The consideration of the feasibility of
response and associated costs, however, is not included in the risk
ranking phase of a comparative risk project (as described below).
The typical comparative risk project plans to consider these criteria
in a second phase of analysis.  However, these second analytic proc-
esses have not been as rigorous as the initial risk analysis. Therefore,
the completion of the priority-setting exercise is usually abandoned
because information from the second phase of the project is neces-
sary but lacking in the risk ranking.
The abandonment of the analysis of the feasibility and costs of
managing risks could be a function of the second challenge facing
priority-setting, that other efforts are continuously underway which
result in the setting of the actual priorities for an environmental
agency. For example, the legislative budgeting process often leads to
the effective prioritization of agency activities. Furthermore, internal
processes within each agency can lead to different levels of activity
between solid waste, air, water, hazardous waste, habitat protection,
endangered species, and other agency programs. These agency pro-
grams are the direct result of historical decisions regarding both pro-
gram scope and design.  Since the scope and design analyses were
largely made independent from one another, there is no mechanism
in place to encourage the shifting of resources between them.  Com-
5. CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: PLANNING
FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT, FINAL REPORT 50 (1994).
6.  PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENT 1991: RISKS TO VERMONT AND VERMONTERS (1991).
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parative risk projects typically cannot bring together enough political
power to overcome all of that historical baggage.  Nonetheless, in a
few rare cases, such as the State of Washington7 and the City of Seat-
tle8, agency leadership used their political capital to adjust agency
priorities in the wake of comparative risk projects. Even in these
cases, however, the shifting of resources from an issue posing low
risks to one posing high risks did not occur.
Two recent comparative risk projects show a closer fit to the
ideal priority-setting exercise.  These projects are taking place in
Northeast Ohio9 and in the Elizabeth River area of Virginia10.  In the
Northeast Ohio project, the risk ranking was followed by a discussion
about which issues presented an opportunity for realigning the priori-
ties, which were identified as those issues that did not have any ex-
isting government agencies taking the lead.  Such an approach is
quite unlike actions proposed by projects hosted by environmental
agencies whose responsibilities for action are dictated by legislative
bodies.  In the Elizabeth River project, the clean-up of the river was
the focus and sole objective throughout the project duration.11 There-
fore, the choice of strategies to accomplish the clean-up was focused
upon a narrow range of possibilities.  It is important to note that in
both cases the projects were not hosted by environmental agencies
with pre-existing priorities. These two projects suggest that compara-
tive risk can be a part of a priority setting exercise. However, they do
not provide much guidance to environmental agencies that have a
wide range of responsibilities and are searching for a way to
strengthen environmental programs by shifting resources from pro-
grams addressing lower risk problems.12
7.  WASHINGTON ENVIRONMENT 2010, TOWARD 2010: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION
AGENDA 2-3, 8 (July 1990).
8.  THE CITY OF SEATTLE’S ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION AGENDA, ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP IN SEATTLE (October 1992).
9.   CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV. CENTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENT PRIORITIES PROJECT, IN OHIO STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 407
(1995).
10. THE ELIZABETH RIVER PROJECT, ELIZABETH RIVER RESTORATION, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (1996).
11. See id. at 1.
12. At a recent meeting of comparative risk project managers, the issue of priority setting
was discussed.  This group agreed that priorities as described by shifting resources from one
program to another is not the objective of most comparative risk projects.  However, this group
did identify that comparative risk has been used to focus attention on particular issues - another
way of thinking about priorities. JOANNE DEA & SUSAN THOMAS, GREEN MOUNTAIN IN-
STITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEMOCRACY, BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN STATE COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECTS (1997).
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IV.  BEYOND PRIORITIZATION
Though comparative risk projects may not be directly successful
at setting priorities for environmental agencies, they accomplish
other important objectives.  One such objective is assisting in the
long-term efforts to shift resources to higher risk problems.  Another
possible objective is informing the public about the project results to
enhance their understanding of relative risks.  However, actual
change in the public sector will normally only occur among those who
are active in the development and discussion of the risk analysis.
This issue will be addressed in more detail in a subsequent section of
this article.  Probably the most significant results from comparative
risk projects include the education of, and the formation of a dia-
logue between, stakeholders concerning the subject of environmental
harm.  Such change provides a foundation for enhanced discussions
in a wide variety of decision-making arenas (e.g., legislative budget
discussions or internal agency planning processes).  Beyond priority
setting, the development of informed dialogue has led to more easily
observable short term results.
V.  HOW TO COMPARE RISKS
There is a four-step fundamental “how to” for comparing risks:
(1) sharply defining the problem or problems that pose the risks; (2)
articulating the values that should serve as criteria for analysis; (3)
using technical expertise to evaluate each problem against those cri-
teria; and (4) combining the results for each criteria into a single met-
ric so that two problems or outcomes can be ranked or “compared.”
The value of the outcome of any comparison of risks rests on the
strength of these four steps.  The process used to develop each of
these four steps varies with each comparative risk project, but those
variations can be categorized based on answers to a series of ques-
tions.  These questions relate to the overall structure of the project.
· Who designs and implements each of the four steps?
· Who carries out the analysis?
· What is the role of science, scientists, and the public in the 
process?
After these questions are addressed, questions related to the
four steps of the risk comparison process fine tune the project.
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· How is the problem list designed and who is involved?
· How are the criteria developed and translated for the
analysts?
· How are the criteria translated in the analysis to yield the 
technical reports?
· How is the technical information processed to yield a rank-
ing?
There is discussion in academic circles regarding the answers to
each of these questions.13  However, it is my experience in observing
comparative risk projects that the utility of any comparative risk
process is more dependent on the inclusiveness of participants than
on the technical validity of the ranking scheme.  For this reason,
comparative risk projects should rely on extensive process in defining
a problem list, identifying criteria for evaluation, instructing technical
experts as to how to carry out the analysis, and actually carrying out a
risk ranking.  If the objective is to introduce scientific information
into the decision-making process, those who are charged with making
the decisions must first be willing to consider the information.  As
such, it is important to recognize that if a highly technical process is
the mechanism for communicating the risk information, and the deci-
sion-makers were not involved with the development of this process,
there is a possibility that the information will not be used.
Traditional risk assessments for regulatory purposes (such as the
atrazine and Superfund decisions) are usually conducted by technical
staff from environmental agencies who follow prescribed steps for
determining the analytic variables of exposure and toxicity. While
discussions focusing on the details of these steps receive a great deal
of attention, they are not part of the focus in comparative risk proj-
ects. However, as an issue and/or audience becomes broader, both
the range of expertise and the complexity of carrying out and re-
porting the analysis expands.  For example, when considering issues
such as solid waste management or criteria air pollutants, there is a
broad range of exposures from the potential pollutants.  With issues
such as habitat alteration or global climate change, even broader
questions of biodiversity, geographic extent, and reversibility of im-
pact will lead to far different analyses than will an issue such as a
simple increase in frequency of a single human health endpoint.
13. See id.
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Though comparing risks so diverse as global climate change and
solid waste management can be daunting to even the most learned
technical experts, state and local comparative risk projects have suc-
cessfully carried out the comparisons.14  The mechanism with which
such complex issues have been successfully addressed includes a se-
ries of questions which help participants to contemplate the issues
objectively while at the same time allowing for the incorporation of
those participants’ values.  Some examples of the questions to con-
sider for the analysis and ranking are included below:
· Do you consider risks to the general population?
· Do you consider risks to specific sub-populations?  Which
sub-populations?
· Do you report risk assessment calculations as traditionally 
done?
· Do you include a range of assessments dependent upon the
assumptions?
· Do you differentiate different health endpoints?  Skin cancer
v. lung cancer; Glaucoma v. skin rash v. developmental
problems; Effects to the older age populations v. the young
· Do impacts which cause a shift in species composition pose 
greater risk than impacts which affect the population of a
single species?
· Do impacts which have intense local effects pose greater risk 
than those which have a greater geographic distribution but
less severe impacts?
· Do impacts which cause a decrease in tourism dollars pose 
greater risk than those which displace resource dependent
jobs?
In order to understand the range of project types, I will briefly
outline four projects and their structures which provide different an-
swers to the questions raised above.
14. See, e.g., TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5; ELIZABETH RIVER RESTORATION, supra note 10;
CONSENSUS RANKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS FACING MAINE, infra note 15; MICHIGAN’S
ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIVE RISK, infra note 16; RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN OHIO, infra note 17.
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Maine Environmental Priorities Project15
In the case of the Maine Environmental Priorities Project, a
group of representatives from industry, environmental groups, com-
munity groups, and government labored for three years to work out
each of the steps of a comparative risk ranking.  This Steering Com-
mittee selected the technical work group members, defined the
problems to be analyzed, developed and carried out the risk ranking,
and edited the wording in the final report. As an example of the ef-
fort involved in developing the risk ranking process, a subcommittee
worked for six months, first testing a few approaches with the full
Steering Committee and then designing the schedule for a two day
retreat.  Even with this extensive preparation, the ranking process
was overhauled within three hours of the first day.
Michigan16
In contrast to Maine, the Michigan comparative risk project was
a much quicker and less complex process.  A consulting firm coordi-
nated the activities of a Scientist Committee, a Citizens Committee,
and an Agency Committee. The Scientist Committee members pro-
duced their White Papers without extensive public committee meet-
ings and the subsequent risk ranking took place without extensive
discussion regarding the process within the other committees. How-
ever, through the work of Task Forces more time has been invested
in developing which strategies to pursue after the risk ranking.
Ohio17
As a mix of the Maine and Michigan processes, the management
of the Ohio project used a Public Advisory Committee to provide
some of the guidance for the analysis and ranking phase. Similarly,
the technical analysis was carried out by a mix of agency staff and
private sector experts. As the date of the ranking approached, the
Advisory Committee focused greater effort on the plan for their
ranking.  It first established specific criteria for the ranking of the
15. MAINE ENVIRONMENT PRIORITIES PROJECT, CONSENSUS RANKING OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL RISKS FACING MAINE, REPORT FROM THE STEERING COMMITTEE (JANUARY
1996).
16. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MICHIGAN’S ENVIRONMENT
AND RELATIVE RISK, MICHIGAN RELATIVE RISK ANALYSIS PROJECT 5-8 (JULY 1992).
17. OHIO COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE ENVI-
RONMENTAL RISK IN OHIO, REPORT FROM PHASE 2 OF THE OHIO COMPARATIVE RISK
PROJECT i-ii, 1 (DECEMBER 1995).
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human health, ecosystem, and quality-of-life technical issues, then
additional framework was established for integrating the individual
rankings.  A draft ranking resulted which was then open for public
review.  Comments from this review provided a basis for the Advi-
sory Committee to re-evaluate some of its criteria for ranking, which
resulted in an amended final ranking result.
California18
At the outset, some participants in the California Comparative
Risk project were skeptical about the concept of comparative risk.
Therefore, an extensive effort was undertaken to identify other ele-
ments of analysis that could enhance the comparison of risks.  Thus,
in addition to a risk ranking team, California established groups to
look into Environmental Justice, Economic Analysis, and Environ-
mental Education as alternatives to risk ranking. The technical analy-
sis from the collaborative risk ranking phase of the project was one of
the most extensive analytic processes carried out to date. Unfortu-
nately, the Statewide Community Advisory Committee has not had
the opportunity to fully review the efforts of the technical teams and
no risk ranking or follow up to the analysis has taken place.
VI.  SPECIFIC PROJECT RESULTS
As previously noted, a comparative risk ranking does not neces-
sarily result in a noticeable shift in agency resources.  However, there
are numerous examples of risk rankings where such a shift occurred.
For example, in the Maine Environmental Priorities Project
(“MEPP”), several activities involving Steering Committee members
are currently being conducted.19  In one such activity, MEPP is par-
ticipating in the design of an alternative to a referendum banning
clear cutting as a forestry practice.  Governor King specifically re-
quested that a collaborative process be employed to develop the pro-
posal, and overall participation in the activity was further enhanced
due to the experiences gained during the MEPP process.  Similarly,
Ohio Governor Voinovich decided to direct $500,000 to Environ-
mental Education in order to utilize the results of the comparative
risk project.20  In Colorado, the Department of Health continues to
18. See generally TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5.
19. See CONSENSUS RANKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS FACING MAINE, supra note 15.
20. See generally RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN OHIO, su-
pra note 17.
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use the results of its 1990 project to provide strategic guidance.21  In
Virginia, the Elizabeth River Project (Norfolk, VA) used a compara-
tive risk ranking process to develop and integrate information in pur-
suit of management strategies to enhance protection efforts.22  After
the risk ranking was completed, many of the participants worked with
project staff and government representatives to explore possible
management strategies.  Publicity from the project raised the visibil-
ity of the project and the community’s interest in seeing action.  As a
result, products of the project include a study by the Army Corps of
Engineers, a University of Virginia field test of a bioremediation
process for sediments, a wetland restoration project coordinated
through the City of Norfolk, and Virginia DEC enhanced monitoring
capabilities.  Finally, the Program for the Environment at Case West-
ern Reserve University coordinated a comparative risk project for
the 4-county area surrounding Cleveland, OH.23 As with the Eliza-
beth River Project, the risk ranking followed a standard model of
technical information which had been used as a basis for public dis-
cussions. The risk ranking then served as the starting point for the
development of appropriate activities for the project to participate in.
As discussed earlier, the chief criterion for selecting these activities
was the absence of existing coordinating bodies. All of these exam-
ples, in the aggregate, demonstrate the wide range of responses that
can be effected by the collaborative assessment process of compara-
tive risk.
VII. GENERAL PROJECT RESULTS
A.  Rankings
As priorities are not the impetus of comparative risk projects,
rankings are not necessarily the most substantive result.  In fact,
rankings typically contain very strong caveats regarding their ulti-
mate use and interpretation.  In addition, a review of the rankings
from different projects does not yield any dramatic trends.  There-
fore, it is probably inappropriate to draw conclusions from the col-
lected rankings of the different projects.
21. OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, COLORADO DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, ACTION PLAN (1991); MULTI-MEDIA FOCAL GROUP, COLORADO ENVIRONMENT
2000, PROGRESS REPORT (APRIL 1993).
22. See ELIZABETH RIVER RESTORATION, supra note 10.
23. See THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT PRIORITIES PROJECT, supra note 9.
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B.  Partnerships/Cooperation
Many participants are surprised with the level of cooperation
that is developed through a comparative risk project.  The specific
project results described above demonstrate the range of efforts that
can be effected by participation in the comparative risk process.
C.  Changing perceptions
Evidence that information changes people’s perceptions and/or
opinions is not widely available for many policy issues. Very few
comparative risk projects measure the change in opinion; however, in
at least one case, the change in opinion about relative risk is well
documented. Prior to carrying out a structured risk ranking process,
this comparative risk project in Vermont, “Environment 1991,”
polled the public about the relative risk of a range of issues.24  The re-
sults of the poll are noticeably different from the risk ranking results
developed by the project’s Public Advisory Committee. While this is
an isolated example, staff members of the Green Mountain Institute
interviewed project participants in numerous states and the results
indicate that the shift may be typical for all or most comparative risk
projects.  However, it should be noted that a high level of participa-
tion in the projects is required to have observable shifts in percep-
tion.  Thus, members of the public exposed to only the results of a
ranking may not show any significant change in perception.
D.  Accessible information
The development of technical reports that present information
in a consistent framework results in more accessible information than
is typically available from environmental agencies.  Each project de-
velops a series of technical reports, the sum of which often runs in the
hundreds of pages. However, these technical reports are typically
used for the risk ranking and therefore the information within them
is more readily accessible to a non-technical audience.  In addition,
most projects summarize these results in a more readable publication.
24. See ENVIRONMENT 1991: RISKS TO VERMONT AND VERMONTERS, supra note 6.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The significance of comparative risk may have more clarity after
considering the process and results of actual projects.  I suggest the
following working definition: Comparative risk is a dialogue between
those who have information about the environment and those who
make decisions.  Note that this definition does not include a sharp
delineation of the decisions that can be affected.  This is intended to
preclude the exclusive use of comparative risk as a priority setting
exercise and to embrace the possibility that comparative risk may
serve as a foundation for a wide range of decisions. Referring to the
original five options for using comparative risk, this definition allows
for a wide array of decisions, including regulations regarding pollut-
ant levels, Superfund cleanups, priority setting, education, and
building collaborative processes.  However, existing bureaucratic sys-
tems appear to preclude the use of any new process in projects al-
ready underway.  Therefore, most of the effort in comparative risk
projects is intended to inform participants of environmental decisions
and develop a collaborative assessment process to ensure broader
participation in future decisions (if the bureaucracies are ready for
that participation).
Additionally, the experience gained from comparative risk
should prove useful when developing a cost-benefit analysis aimed at
decision-making.  Specifically, the fact that comparative risk relies
heavily on a collaborative process for structuring the analysis and
processing the information necessitates that the results from that
analysis will be important to those who are considering how to struc-
ture the analysis for cost-benefit.  Furthermore, detailing the struc-
ture of either comparative risk or cost-benefit in the absence of broad
participation will probably yield an academic or advocates’ analysis
rather than an analysis that addresses the values of a broad audience.
Comparative risk could also be useful in broadening the values
of strict analytical processes when those processes seem to yield re-
sults promoting a particular policy position.  For example, a revision
of risk assessment assumptions that reduces the calculated risk from
exposure to a pollutant is often cited as a preferable analysis by those
interested in relaxing regulations.  The use of comparative risk to
consider a wider range of issues, such as global climate change and
pesticide use, precludes the identification of polarized positions and
allows for dialogue about the different values at risk. Furthermore, it
is my strong opinion, based on the observation of several compara-
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tive risk projects, that strengthening comparative risk is better ac-
complished through enhancing the process of information exchange
rather than utilizing a technical model for comparing quantitative in-
formation.
Finally, human nature dictates that people who invest a large
amount of time and energy to a cause demand results.  As such, my
experience over the past seven years in comparative risk leads me to
the conclusion that collaborative decision processes are the key to
moving beyond the rigid structure of current bureaucratic decision
processes.
